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TO : Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates **DATE:** 3 May 1954
THRU : Assistant Director for Operations
FROM : Chief, FBID

SUBJECT: NIE 11-4-54

Submitted herewith are observations from propaganda analysis which have bearing on the questions in Section I A 1 of the terms of reference for subject estimate. Contributions on selected questions from other Sections will follow later this week.

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SECRET

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION (NIE 11-4-54)

Observations from Propaganda Analysis

Section I A 1

Contents

SECRET

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

Observations from Propaganda Analysis

A. The Ruling Group (I A 1 a)

What are the relative power positions of and the relationships between the members of the Soviet ruling group? Are changes likely to occur within this group during the period of this estimate which would affect the authority of the regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy?

Propaganda analysis, by indicating the public esteem accorded Soviet leaders, can provide one element in the determination of their relative power positions and the relationships existing among them.

Since the promulgation of the new agricultural measures (September 1953) Khrushchev has been most intimately associated with this program. Although Malenkov had provided the rationale for the shift of attention to agriculture in his Supreme Soviet speech (8 August) and initiated some of the Governmental measures to implement the new program, his name has almost never been associated with it. The August Supreme Soviet session as a whole has been relatively neglected in listings of important sources of current Soviet policy, and when it has been mentioned Malenkov's address has not been singled out, as Khrushchev's reports to the September and February plenums were.

This seems all the more remarkable in view of the fact that Malenkov had even earlier signalled the new program, at Stalin's funeral and again at the Supreme Soviet meeting on 15 March 1953. At that time he asserted the need to "strive for further advancement and flourishing of all collective farms of the Soviet land and to strengthen the alliance of working class and collective farm peasantry." The doctrine of "strengthening the worker-peasant alliance," dormant for over two decades, was to provide the ideological basis for the new economic program on its announcement by Khrushchev (September 1953) as well as in almost all subsequent elite statements. Thus Malenkov's role in initiating the new program is clear.

While Malenkov may have effaced himself purposely under the principle of collective leadership in order to escape personal responsibility for possible failures in the agricultural program, his effacement seems to have been carried rather far by his colleagues. Khrushchev has never publicly alluded to Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet which set the stage for his Reports to the Central Committee. Khrushchev himself was mentioned more prominently than Malenkov by Mikoyan and Kosygin in speeches last fall. Voroshilov, in his 6 November speech, spoke of G. M. Malenkov but of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev; this use of first name and patronymic is a mark of respect among Russians which has had political significance under the Soviet regime. In the election campaign, while most of the

elite speakers avoided reference to living leaders, Khrushchev was mentioned twice (by Saburov and Pervukhin, reputed proteges of Malenkov) and Molotov once (by Voroshilov), but Malenkov was not mentioned by a single speaker.

Despite the failure of Soviet leaders to display special esteem for Malenkov, he has continued to get wider publicity than his colleagues. He was nominated much more frequently than Khrushchev or Molotov in the recent elections. The editors of the published version of his election speech accorded him far more applause than they allowed other speakers for whom this information was given.

Khrushchev's special status is apparent from the fact that he stood well ahead of Molotov in nominations to the Supreme Soviet, although lists of the top leadership continue to put Molotov ahead of him. On the occasion of Khrushchev's 60th birthday (April) the Central Committee's message of congratulations placed unusual emphasis on (1) his working class origins, (2) his contributions going back to the Civil War period, and (3) his role as a "leader of the Soviet State" (as well as the Party). The fact that only Saburov and Pervukhin, of the election speakers, referred to Khrushchev suggests a defensive tactic, to indicate that although they have been closely associated with Malenkov they also support Khrushchev. (This tactic was apparently used by Beria (March 1953) and Bagirov (May 1953), who made public references to Malenkov.) In Georgia, Mzhavanadze, reputedly a Khrushchev appointee as First Secretary, referred only to Malenkov in his Report. These devices provide further evidence of Khrushchev's strength and some indication of the rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev.

Both Kirichenko + Kapitonov, other "associates" more of Khrushchev, have nominated & seconded the Malenkov govt at Supreme Soviet

An inconclusive indication that Malenkov is dissatisfied with his position among the ruling group may be contained in the fact that he alone, of the fifteen election speakers, failed to mention the Central Committee in his election speech. All other speakers referred to the Central Committee at least twice; Khrushchev mentioned it 12 times. If Malenkov's failure to mention that body was not deliberate, it could reflect subconscious resentment; and similarly Khrushchev might unconsciously tend to refer to a principal source of his strength. If these variations were conscious, their significance would be heightened, possibly indicating that the Central Committee has somehow become a symbol of disagreements among the leaders. Khrushchev treated the Central Committee with unwonted deference in his September Report, when he offered <u>for discussion</u> a proposal that some 50,000 urban Party cadres be sent to the countryside. (Partial implementation of this proposal, particularly in the Ukraine, has since been achieved.)

There have been indications Khrushchev shares Malenkov's authority with respect to the Satellites. In the extension of the new economic program outside the USSR, it is again apparent that Malenkov established the new line, both by his reintroduction of the worker-peasant doctrine at Stalin's funeral and by his remarks at the August Supreme Soviet meeting, when he explicitly related the doctrine to the problems of the Orbit. Bierut explicitly credited Malenkov for the introduction of the new policy in the People's Democracies in his speech announcing the program for Poland (29 October). But Khrushchev's authority has been evident more recently. He was the principal speaker at the Polish Party Congress (March) which firmed up the new course measures. On his birthday he received telegrams from the Satellites which were published in the Soviet central press

B. Bases of Authority (I A 1 b) The Military

Bases of Authority: What changes have occurred in the institutional bases of Soviet authority (Party, police, military)?

Despite a drop in volume, the content of Soviet military propaganda since Stalin's death suggests a distinct rise in the prestige of the armed forces. This increase in stature seems to have resulted from the de-emphasis of Stalin as supreme war lord and from the shift in the Army - MVD balance of power. It is reflected in propaganda attention to military events previously ignored and in the prominence of Army leaders in such honorary institutions as the Supreme Soviet. Propaganda attention to armed forces since Stalin's death continues to be occasioned primarily by anniversary celebrations, such as Army-Navy Day, V-E Day, and the Stalingrad victory commemoration. The total number of commentaries in all beams dealing specifically with the armed forces in the year since Stalin's death is less than 40% of the number heard in the previous year. In the Home Service the decline in attention is somewhat smaller, to 65% of the previous year. In newscasts to the Soviet audience references to the armed forces declined about 50%.

Fortuitous circumstances account in part for the higher level of attention to the armed forces in the twelve months before Stalin's death, principally the fact that the Army-Navy anniversary in February 1953, two weeks before Stalin's death, was the 35th, and received the greater volume of publicity customarily accorded quinquennials. A general policy of avoiding emphasis on the armed forces in Soviet propaganda presumably also influenced the decline in the number of broadcasts; a low level of Soviet military strength claims seems a necessary corollary to a foreign policy designed to create the impression of relaxed international tension.

This quantitative drop in attention, however, is not necessarily an indication of a decline in the prestige of the Soviet military establishment, and the content of Soviet armed forces propaganda suggests a distinct rise in prestige and status.

In most respects, propaganda content continues to follow the lines laid down by Stalin in February 1928, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Red Army. The consistent conception of the Soviet Army, as developed by Communist propagandists from Stalin's remarks, is in outline as follows: The Soviet Army is (1) the army of the liberated workers and peasants; (2) the army of the fraternity of peoples of the USSR; and (3) the incarnation of the spirit of internationalism, respect for other countries, and love for the workers of the world.

The propaganda goals served by this conception are: (1) to marshal home front support of the Army from the major social classes; (2) to gain support from all Soviet national groups; and (3) to ensure the existence of friends and allies in all parts of the world. There has been no departure from this conception since Stalin's death.

There has, however, been one striking deviation from past propaganda treatment of the armed forces. Since the late twenties when the great campaign was launched to elevate Stalin to the superman level, Soviet propaganda has given lavish credit to Stalin personally for major Soviet successes in every conceivable field of activity. In the military field, emphasis on the military genius and leadership of Stalin seems to have been designed in part to prevent inflated glorification of the armed forces and its active leaders, and so to forestall a potentially dangerous rise in public prestige and the possibility of an independent military policy. Coupled with a total avoidance of mention of non-political military leaders in the propaganda, this practice tended to drive home the impression that the armed forces were strictly the instruments of Stalin, created and built by him and operating under his direct and close supervision. In the Army-Navy Day propaganda this year, however, not one of the nine broadcasts heard over the Home Service so much as mentioned Stalin's name.* With Stalin out of the way, propaganda credit for the success of Soviet arms has shifted to the Soviet Socialist System, or the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, that is hailed as being responsible for the victories of the Soviet Union's Army and Navy. Old slogans and cliches about the armed forces are patched up with the obvious substitution of a more general phrase in the holes left by the excision of Stalin's name.

It is apparent that the depersonalization of external credits for Soviet military successes should tend to increase the prestige of the armed forces in the eyes of the Soviet people. Liberated from the strait-jacket of the Stalin legend, the new image of the Army is more distinct, more independent, conveying the impression of a separate institution with a history and traditions all its own.

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* These broadcasts included Marshal Bulganin's Order of the Day (heard five times); the speeches of six Soviet officials at the main Moscow celebration; a talk by Lt. Gen. Shatilov; and a Pravda editorial. There were some references to Stalin in regional transmissions (most notably a talk by Col. Gen. Odintsev on the Ukranian Regional Service), but even in these the praise of Stalin was not nearly so frequent or lavish as in previous years.

Perhaps to offset this impression, Army-Navy Day propagandists this year went to great lengths to stress the popular, all-people's nature of the Soviet armed forces. Speeches at the main Moscow celebration by Defense Minister Bulganin, Moscow party secretary Mikhailov, Trade Union Council chairman Shvernik, Academician Nesmeyanov, Komsomol secretary Shelepin, and Kolkhoz chairman Ozhirkov emphasized the identification of the Soviet armed forces with the major social classes and governmental and public organizations represented by the speakers. Although similar meetings had been reported in previous years, they were not the central focus of the anniversary celebration and speeches made at the meetings were not usually broadcast. None in the past appeared so carefully staged and specifically designed to create the impression conveyed in 1954. The fact that no high-ranking military leader--as opposed to political Marshal Bulganin--addressed the main Moscow celebration should not be regarded as evidence of a slighting of military leaders. The Home Service also carried an Army-Navy Day message by Lt. Gen. Shatilov, and regional services broadcast a number of talks by active military commanders.

Attention to routine military events previously ignored in Soviet broadcasts also indicates increased prestige for the armed forces. In October, November, and December of 1953, for example, the Home Service carried reports of graduations at the Voroshilov and Frunze Military Academies and took note of a military meeting in honor of the 35th anniversary of the latter institution. A number of high-ranking professional soldiers (Marshal Sokolovsky, Gen. Kuryatov, Col. Gen. Zheltov, and Col. Gen. Zhadov) were identified for listeners and reports of their speeches were broadcast.

That renewed interest in pre-revolutionary military history (stressed during World War II when Army prestige was at an all-time high) may become a corollary to the new Army propaganda policy is indicated by the unusual attention paid the 50th anniversary of the sinking of the Russian cruiser "Varyag" during the Russo-Japanese War. Twelve "Varyag" broadcasts were heard, in February of this year, including four in the Home Service (but none in Japanese). This would not be unusual publicity for a great victory, but it constitutes anomalous treatment of a disastrous defeat.

On January 19, a widely broadcast Izvestia article signed with the unique pseudonym "Retired General" was the first authoritative Soviet response to the announcement of the American policy of "massive retaliation." The use of a military title to lend authority to such an important policy commentary seems also to reflect the high prestige currently enjoyed by the Army. Increased use of ostensibly military figures to deliver policy statements is one tactic which might be adopted in a propaganda build-up of the Army and would suggest increased participation of the Army in broad policy determination.

The sharp increase this year in the number of military leaders elected to the Supreme Soviet (31 of 1272 in 1950 and 59* of 1316 in 1954) and the singling out of military deputies for praise are other signs of increased military prestige. In welcoming the newly elected deputies on the occasion of the first session of the Supreme Soviet on 20 April, a Pravda editorial makes specific reference to the soldier-deputies, ranking them relatively high in the list of groups enumerated: "The Soviet people enthusiastically welcome their elected representatives--outstanding workers of the Communist Party and Soviet State, leading workers and collective farmers, warriors of the Soviet Army and Navy, well-known workers of science and culture, and the best sons and daughters of our great multinational state."

The chairmen of the Credentials Commissions of both the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union singled out Army deputies in making their reports on April 23:

> The Soviet of Nationalities includes leading Party, Soviet, trade union and economic workers, as well as representatives of the Soviet Army. The election of the representatives of the Soviet Army to the highest organ of the USSR State power shows that the Soviet people love their Army, which reliably guards the frontiers of the State and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. (Applause)
>
> Comrade Deputies: The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are vigilantly standing guard over the frontiers of our Motherland and the peaceful work of the Soviet people. The Soviet people deeply love their own Army and have elected to the Soviet of the Union 47 representatives of the Armed Forces of the Soviet State.

Even more striking is the inclusion of the names of Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky in the list of twenty leading candidates for the Supreme Soviet issued by the Party's Central Committee. Not since 1946 when the military was still riding the crest of wartime popularity and publicity have active professional soldiers been so honored (Budenny and Voroshilov were on the list in 1950, but they can no longer be regarded as active regular army officers). The list is usually restricted to

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* The official report of the Credentials Commission of the Soviet of the Union stated that 47 representatives of the armed forces were deputies in that body. Similar information was not included in the report of the Credentials Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, but by analogy the estimated 59 for both organs may then be too low.

high party officials. Zhukov's return from seclusion in the provinces to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense is in itself an outstanding indication of increased military prestige, particularly in view of his reputed popularity.

In the course of Soviet history, the secret police has been used as a check and counterpoise to the Army. An important function of the secret police has been to keep watch on the political reliability of the Army and to prevent the crystallization of any peculiarly "Army" as distinct from "Party" points of view. MVD control of strong armed units of its own has constituted additional insurance against the pursuit of an independent course by Army leaders. Any serious decline in the prestige and influence of the secret police therefore tends to swing the balance in the Army's favor.

It appears that just such a decline in the prestige and influence of the secret police has occurred in the USSR. The cashiering of Beria, regarded since 1930 as the source and symbol of the secret police system, could not but have important prestige implications for the MVD. The composition of the special judicial panel which sentenced Beria to death reflects the shift in the Army-secret police balance. The chairmanship of Konev and the participation of Moskalenko on the five-member panel gave the Army a key role in the proceedings.

Among the many signs that the MVD has been stripped of previous functions, there is evidence that some of its strictly military functions have been taken over by the Defense Ministry. In a unique broadcast of a Ministry order in September 1953 releasing men who had completed their terms of active service and calling a new class to the colors, the "frontier and internal forces" were lumped together with the Soviet Army and Navy. This may indicate that control over armed units formerly under the MVD has now been vested in the Ministry of Defense.

This inference is supported by the Party slogans for the 36th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1953 and for May Day in 1953 and 1954. The old slogans hailing the frontier guards (e.g., "Long live the Soviet frontier guards, vigilant sentries of the sacred frontiers of our Motherland") have been dropped and only a single armed forces slogan, placed first in the group devoted to domestic affairs, is now presented.

C. Domestic Policies and Social Tensions (I A 1 c)

What changes have occurred or are likely to occur in the policies adopted by the regime toward the administrative bureaucracies, the intelligentsia, the workers and the peasants? To what extent have the domestic policies adopted by the new Soviet regime reflected its estimate of the reliability of particular social groups and its concern for popular morale? Are any domestic policies or political or social issues within the USSR likely to develop in such a way as either to weaken or strengthen the authority of the regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy?

1. The Peasants

Malenkov's concern to improve the economic well-being of the peasant, in the USSR as well as in the Orbit, is evident in the fact that he has called for strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance in five of his six speeches since Stalin's death. The relative weight placed on purely economic calculations as against concern about the political reliability of the peasantry in formulating and implementing the new Soviet program is uncertain.

Soviet propaganda screens out all evidences of disaffection, so that only indirect indications bearing on the problem are available. The most remarkable of these appeared in Mikoyan's speech of 24 October 1953, which spoke of the worker-peasant alliance as "forming a granite citadel against capitalism." Since capitalism had long since been relegated by Soviet propaganda to mere "survivals in the consciousness of the people," Mikoyan's remark may reflect the concern of high Soviet leaders about continuing peasant dislike for Soviet institutions. At the time of the purge of Beria the Soviet theoretical journal, KOMMUNIST spoke of the danger of the"revival of private ownership tendencies among a backward part of the collective farms."

Khrushchev's proposal in September to send some 50,000 urban Party cadres to the countryside, which has been partially implemented, is also ambiguous in its meaning. In part the measure is clearly intended to assure efficient use of the increased resources made available to agriculture. At the same time its effect must be to increase Party controls over the peasantry, and, in view of the history of the CPSU, it is most likely that this is also an element in its motivation. It seems quite possible that Beria opposed the agricultural measures of the new regime insofar as they lessened the power of the secret police in rural areas, substituting the direct control of the Party over the peasantry. In fact, Beria's apparent maneuvering on the question of policy toward national minorities which, indirectly, affects the greater part of the peasantry--strongly

suggests that the question of political reliability of the peasantry, in particular among the national minorities, may have been at issue between Beria and other Soviet leaders, with Beria advocating an indulgent policy.

How far Beria had gone in his appeal to ambitious members of the minority intelligentsia, and perhaps ultimately to the peasant, was indicated by KOMMUNIST (late July, 1953), when it indirectly accused him of tampering with the "selection and placement of cadres (which) directly touches the very foundation of the multinational, socialist state--the friendship of peoples of the USSR." Thus, while Beria was trying to strengthen the position of minority Party cadres, apparently in the countryside particularly, the effect of Khrushchev's proposals may well be the opposite, to strengthen the representation of Russians in important rural Party posts. For the non-Russian peasant, this may mean that his direction by Russians, representing a centralized bureaucracy, will be intensified and will be experienced more directly.

Thus increased Party control of the peasant must be developing as a result of the economic and political measures of the new program. It would appear likely that whatever level of peasant disaffection obtained at Stalin's death, after the intensive consolidation of collective farms had already tightened Party control, will tend to be increased in some degree by the peasant's experience of still greater immediate pressures from the Party and the State. This increase will presumably be balanced in some measure by the economic concessions allowed peasants in income from their private plots, as well as from their participation in collective farm work; moreover the peasant's capability for expressing his disaffection will presumably be weaker than before.

2. Minority Nationalities.

There were numerous indications of a more indulgent nationalities policy in the period from Stalin's death to mid-June 1953. For the most part these took the form of statements by the central committees of republics along the Soviet border that the nationalities policy had been violated in the direction of severity towards minorities. After his arrest, Beria was charged with making false accusations that the nationalities policy had been violated, and the indications of a more indulgent policy largely disappeared from propaganda.

The following month, at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet (5 August) there were protestations of friendship for the Great Russian people from representatives of each republic which had criticized Russification before the purge of Beria (Ukraine, Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania).

This was a departure from the practice of previous sessions of the Supreme Soviet, where friendship for the Great Russian people had been infrequently mentioned, and then almost exclusively by representatives of the eastern republics. The intention, presumably, was to disclose by implication the connection between Beria and the earlier criticisms of Russification, to disavow these criticisms, and to accept narrower limits for national autonomy than those which Beria had been advocating. (At the present session of the Supreme Soviet, April 1954, the role of the Great Russian people again lapsed into insignificance, although one Government spokesman did hit at the efforts of "enemies" to "disunite" the nationalities of the Soviet Union.)

In the months after the 1953 meeting of the Supreme Soviet (August), there were numerous indications that Soviet policy toward minority nationalities, particularly in the Transcaucasus, had stiffened, although occasional phrases of the "liberal phase" were repeated. In connection with the 300th anniversary of the union of the Ukraine with Russia, it began to appear that the Ukraine (and perhaps Belorussia) was to have a favored position as a Slavic nation. That Georgia is still suspect was evident in Pervukhin's election speech in Tiflis, where he warned against separatism, and spoke of the benefits of union with the USSR.

Beria's program on the nationalities question approached most closely issues involving political power in the call for increased use of members of minority nationalities in Party and State positions in the provincial republics. This was advocated not only by the central committees of some republics, but also by a PRAVDA editorial before Beria's purge. No indications of such policy have appeared subsequent to the arrest of Beria.

However, the oppressive policy seemingly foreshadowed by the doctor-plot (January 1953) has apparently died with Stalin. Molotov inveighed in his election speech against Tsarist anti-Semitism (there appears to be no precedent for this at least since the war), and Kaganovich quoted the Constitutional provision on the equality of Soviet citizens, which also prohibits "preaching racial or national hatred." This theme has rarely been presented in Soviet propaganda. However, it appeared in Soviet comment on the reversal of the doctor-plot, and its repetition a year later by Kaganovich (himself a Jew) suggests that Soviet leaders intended to reassure the minority nationalities, including the Jews, that the status quo would be maintained.

3. Intelligentsia.

a. Creative Artists: Discussion by Ehrenberg and Shostakovich, among others, of the need of creative artists for greater freedom has not resulted in an evident change of policy on the question, although it may have encouraged some boldness in restive artists.

There appears to be some uncertainty even in high Soviet circles as to the correct policy.

Kirichenko, Ukrainian First Secretary, in attacking the "idyllic" portrayal of Soviet reality on 23 March, simply called for greater emphasis on the "difficulties" in Soviet life. However, discussion of this subject in a Pravda editorial (12 April) after also first criticizing the use of "idyllic tones," proceeded to attack the "portrayal of only negative phenomena" which "has been particularly noticable recently in dramaturgy as well as in individual articles of criticism."

Although they are being approached delicately, it seems that creative artists are being told that Ehrenburg and Shostakovich went too far.

b. Scientists: The prestige of scientists seems to have risen under the new regime. Elite speeches have explicitly linked this development with the contribution science has made to the Soviet military effort. In February, there was an unusually large number of awards to scientists of the "Order of Lenin" medal, and Nesmyanov, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences, represented the intelligentsia at the public meeting on Army Day. The high-level criticism of Lysenko is probably welcomed by scientists, insofar as it implies that scientific problems will be solved by scientific criteria instead of by political decisions. But scientists continue to be enjoined to work closely with industry in their research, so that this source of resentment on the part of scientists is not likely to be alleviated in the near future.

4. Youth

The recent attacks by Soviet propaganda on deviant youth for aping American ways and disregarding Communist symbols (e.g., using "mister" instead of "comrade") has no clear precedent. The seriousness of the regime's concern was apparent at the recent Komsomol Congress, where youth was subjected to a strong and general attack. This conforms to the general pattern of criticism of youth which gained force in the Satellites during the fall of 1953 and still continues.

Perhaps significantly, youth appeared to be one of the targets of vigilance propaganda at the time of the doctor-plot (January, 1953). Komsomolskaya Pravda took a leading role in the propaganda campaign, and gave detailed directions for correcting the "complacency" which was being attacked. There were repeated references in Pravda editorials and other authoritative sources to "people little experienced in politics who have not seen a great deal" and therefore are made complacent by successes.

Stalin had previously noted the problem of youth in his Bolshevik article published just before the XIX Party Congress (October 1952). He spoke of "new young cadres...who are bewildered by the colossal achievements of Soviet power; they are dizzy with the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that Soviet power 'can do everything.'" Hints appeared at the time of the vigilance campaign that there was some acceptance by youth of the heresy which makes legitimate "the abatement of class struggle and weakening of State authority." In effect, it was intimated that some elements among youth were disaffected with the severities of life under the Soviet regime.

While the "delinquent" youth who have been under recent attack are not identical with the more responsible members of the youth whom Stalin chided, both groups show some lack of acceptance of Soviet policies, and possibly of Soviet goals as well.